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The National War College was founded in 1946 with the
prediction that "its graduates will exercise a great influ-
ence on the formulation of national and foreign policy. • . ."
Inquiry is made in this paper on the question of how well
the College has succeeded in living up to the prediction.
Following a description of the College—its student
body, faculty, facilities, and course of study—an analysis
is made of the location of the graduates in relation to the
power centers of foreign policy formulation. Noteworthy in
this analysis is the revelation that four of the five mem-
bers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thirty-one ambassadors,
and many of the top career foreign service officers in the
Department of State are graduates.
The answers to a questionnaire, sent to 150 graduates,
are tabulated. They reveal that, by a large majority, the
graduates, in addition to having served in positions in
which one would expect them to have influenced foreign policy
determination, consider that they did have such an influence.
The conclusion appears inescapable that the common
educational experience of several hundred high and middle
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
When, in 1946, a War Department Board submitted a
report on future military education and first gave a con-
crete description of what was to become the National War
College, that Board said:
The College is concerned with grand strategy and
the utilization of the national resources necessary
to implement that strategy. • • • Its graduates will
exercise a great influence on the formulation of
national and foreign policy in both peace and
war. . • .!
It is the purpose of this paper to attempt to
marshal facts and opinions sufficient to form a Judgment
on how well the College has succeeded, in its first nine-
teen years, in living up to the foregoing prediction. Has
it had an influence on formulation of the foreign policy
of the United States? If so, has the influence been of a
minor nature, or has it been profound?
The search for definitive answers to these ques-
tions results in the production of much in the way of
circumstantial and indirect evidence. An attempt will be
United States War Department, Report of War Depart-
ment Military Education Board , Lieutenant General Leonard
T. Gerow, President, cited by National War College, The
National War College , Academic Year 1958-1959 (Washington:
The National War College, 1958), p. 6.
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2made to show, by what is hoped to be not too tenuous a
chain of reasoning, (1) what the College is and does; (2)
who the graduates are, and in what government positions
they have been and are currently assigned; and (3) inferen-






The National War College began operations in 1946.
Its establishment had been suggested in studies initiated
during 1945 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and recommended
by several high-level survey boards. The studies of the
Joint Chiefs were begun as a result of bitter experience.
During World War II, it became increasingly evident to the
military leaders of the United States that no longer could
the pre-1941 concept that warfare consisted of separate
land and sea wars be accepted. A new major dimension, war
in the air, had been added. Amphibious operations de-
manded the utmost in cooperation and understanding between
the services. Anti-submarine warfare proved to be complex
The statement is derived from a document in the
Classified Records section of the Library of the National
War College. This document, as well as the scores of
other documents consulted in this section of the College
Library, are NOT security information and, hence, are not
truly "classified" in the usual Department of Defense
meaning. Each of these documents, however, carries a
stamped prohibition against reproduction, quotation from,
abstraction from, or any reference linking the document
with the National War College. Much of the background and
history of the College in the remainder of this chapter is
derived from readings done in these documents, which can-
not, in view of the foregoing, be cited more specifically.
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4far beyond expectations. The maintenance of logistic
lines of supply, reaching to every continent and corner
of the globe, required the closest coordination and rap-
port between representatives of the services. To a large
degree, these demands and requirements were not met satis-
factorily during the hostilities. The successful doc-
trines of amphibious warfare were not in being, except in
the most rudimentary state, in 1941; and trial and error,
with much of the latter, was the order of the day. The
phenomenal growth of air power left many leaders in land
and sea warfare far behind in understanding this giant new
tool of conflict. Especially in logistics was there
waste, confusion, and inefficiency—resulting , in large
measure, from complete lack of sympathetic understanding
of inter-service problems, as well as problems of other
services.
Even more striking in the World War II experience
was the emergence of politico-military problems, accom-
panied by an almost total lack of persons experienced or
trained in solving them. The traditional military think-
ing had been to shy away from matters not having to do
strictly with military affairs. In World War II, the
circumstances of geography and the necessity for coordi-
nating with allies all over the world posed requirements
for civilians in the government service with an
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5understanding of military power, as well as senior offi-
cers of the military with the capability to plan and
negotiate with civilian political leaders. One thinks
immediately of General Eisenhower in conference with Prime
Minister Churchill, or of Mark Clark, Jerauld Wright, and
Robert Murphy going ashore together in North Africa in
1942 from a British submarine to conduct the delicate
negotiations hopefully leading to non-opposition by French
forces to the forthcoming Allied landings. There was
little common ground of thought, little familiarity with
each others* multitudinous problems, and little coordina-
tion of concept between those who formulated our foreign
policies and those who were to fight to implement those
policies.
As early as 1927, the British paved the way in
establishing an institution for systematic study of the
political, military, and economic factors affecting the
national policy. The Imperial Defense College, estab-
lished in London, provided such a curriculum and, more
closely than any other institution, provided the model
2for what became the National War College.
2Visit to the Imperial Defense College, March,
1962, and interviews, 1961-1962, with various officer











6A more immediate stimulus to the founding of the
National War College, however, came from the experiences
of the very early years of World War II, There had been
informal pre-war discussions on the subject, but the real
pressure of conflict was necessary to emphasize the re-
quirement for inter-service understanding and knowledge.
The Chief of the Army Air Forces, General Arnold, had been
impressed repeatedly with the gross ignorance of his offi-
cers regarding land and sea warfare. He reasoned that
what was true of his officers must apply to officers of
other services with respect to air warfare. He, therefore,
proposed to General Marshall and Admiral King, in 1943,
that remedial action be taken. The result was the almost
immediate establishment of the Array-Navy Staff College
(short title: ANSCOL) , with a mission to
train officers of all the arms in the exercise of
command and the performance of staff duties in
unified or coordinated Army and Navy Commands,
[and] to develop methods and ideas for the most
effective employment of all arms and services and
to translate lessons learned in the field into
recommended standard practice, instructions, and
doctrines.
In practice, ANSCOL filled the need admirably and
produced about four hundred senior officers from all the
services, as well as a sprinkling of Foreign Service
Officers, all of whom had been exposed to an intensive
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7reflected the same enthusiasm of National War College
students today for the close association with officers
from other services and the free interchange of ideas
anu. ,g students.
It is not considered necessary to treat in detail
the studies and board reports of 1945 and 1946 which
examined the problem of post-war military education. The
Gerow Report, cited supra , actually proposed the National
War College, by that name, and set out its objectives as:
1. To develop commanders for the highest echelons
of the Armed Forces and key staff officers
qualified to serve on their staffs;
2. To qualify officers for participation in the
formulating of national policy; and
3. To foster understanding and coordination
between the Armed Forces and other agnncies,
government and civil, which are essential to
a national war effort.
It was part of the Gerow plan, however, that the National
War College was to be one component college of a National
Security University and that Foreign Service Officers
would be trained at a State Department College within the
National Security University. In the event, prospects for
a State Department College were not encouraging at the
time. The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered that close
cooperation between the Armed Forces and the Department of
State was absolutely essential and, accordingly, invited







8invitation was immediately and cordially accepted, and the
3College was launched.
II, STUDENT BODY
4The 134 students who are enrolled each August for
the ten-month course at the National War College have very
diverse backgrounds of professional and education experi-
ence* A typical recent class consisted of thirty-four
Army colonels and lieutenant colonels; seven Marine Corps
colonels; twenty-seven Navy captains and commanders;
thirty-four Air Force colonels; one Coast Guard captain;
eighteen Foreign Service Officers of Grades One, Two, and
Three; three employees of the Central Intelligence Agency;
three employees of the United States Information Agency;
four civilian employees of the Department of Defense; and
one employee each of the Bureau of the Budget, the
3In more recent years, the Department of State has
established a Foreign Service Institute, one activity of
which is to conduct a one-year course called a "Senior
Seminar in Foreign Policy." Seniority of the students is
comparable to that of students at the National War
College, and each seminar includes token numbers of
military participants.
4Membership of the first nine classes showed a
gradual increase in numbers from one hundred to substan-










9National Security Agency, and the Department of Commerce.
The average age of the students is forty-four, with
twenty years of Government service.
Probably the widest variation among the students is
in educational background. In the class of 1961-1962, for
instance, there were eighteen members of the student body
without college degrees of any kind; and, in each of the
last eight classes to graduate, there have been at least
nine members with education at less than the Bachelor
level. At the other extreme, in the 1961-1962 class,
there were three students with a Ph.D. degree, thirty-four
with a degree of M,A. or M.S., and six with professional
7degrees in law or medicine. In the class with which the
writer is personally acquainted, that of 1958-1959, the
students and their educational background included an Army
colonel with a Doctor of Engineering degree from Johns
Hopkins University; an Air Force colonel and command pilot
whose degree was Bachelor of Science in Forestry; an Army
5
National War College, The Commandant's Annual
Report
,
1961-62 (Washington: The National War College,
1962) , unpaginated table following p, 4, Hereafter cited
as Commandant f s Report 1961-62 ,
National War College, National War College Statis-
tical Data , Classes of 1947 through 1962 (Washington: The
TTan^naOar College7"l957T.
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infantry colonel with Master's degrees from Yale in both
International Relations and Engineering; an Array colonel
who was a Doctor of Science from Carnegie Institute of
Technology; and a civil servant whose only claim to higher
education was that he had attended "Radio Electronics
8School." Clearly, a large task of the College is to
present the course in an intelligible way to these varie-
gated products of the United States educational system,
without reducing the content to the lowest common denomi-
nator.
In contrast to a civilian educational institution,
the National War College has no control over selection of
the students who will attend. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
lay down broad guidelines, and the rest is left to person-
nel procedures within the services, departments, and
agencies to which quotas are assigned. In most cases,
formal selection boards are utilized. Favoritism in selec-
tion must be avoided, since assignment to the College as a
student is a highly-sought-after and "career significant"
milestone for the selectee, civilian or military.
The age and seniority of the military students have
National War College, Biographies of Staff
,
Faculty and Class Members , 1958-5
§
( Washington! T*h<




varied from year to year, in response to pressures and
criticism from various sources. On the one hand, the
desire of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the National War
College be viewed as the apex of the military educational
system has resulted in a requirement that a portion of the
military students be graduates of the senior courses at
9their own war colleges. This has delayed attendance at
National War College and tended to result in increased age
and seniority.
On the other hand, the current trend in age and
seniority of the military students seems to be downward.
In the current class, over half the military are in the
grade of Lieutenant Colonel/Commander, in contrast to five
9The Army War College, at Carlisle, Pennsylvania;
The Naval War College, at Newport, Rhode Island; The Senior
Officer Course at the Marine Corps Schools Command, Quan-
tico, Virginia; and The Air War College, a component of
the Air University, Maxwell Field, Alabama.
The case for more senior students is made in a
comment received, in answer to the questionnaire which is
the subject of Chapter V, from an Array general officer:
"I think it [the National War College course] the most
intellectually maturing year of my service. The exchange
of ideas, the defense of one's views in an intelligent
arena, the birth of new ideas, and the pride of being -
student at the National War College have, in my opinion,
no equal. However, much of the value stemmed from the
knowle^e and experience of the students which, if the
students are too young and lacking both in experience and
mature wisdom, leaves an empty shell. This, I am afraid,






years earlier, when every military graduate in the class
was a Colonel/Captain.
It is difficult to form a judgment on whether the
fact that a high percentage of graduates of the National
War College go on to become generals, admirals, or ambas-
sadors, is a cause or affect relationship. Selection
procedures ensure only those with the highest promotion
potential will attend, but, certainly, the graduate is
viewed by the leaders of his service or department as thus
better qualified for duties of a higher grade* As an
example, two of seven full Admirals of the Line of the
Navy on active duty are graduates, as well as fourteen of
thirty of the Vice Admirals, and fifty-five of one hundred
seventy-eight of the Rear Admirals. This means about one
third of the flag officers of the Line of the Navy are
graduates, whereas not more than 10 per cent of the eli-
gible Captains, from whom the flag officers were selected,
are graduates. The figures were even better in the fiscal
year 1965 selection for promotion from Captain to Rear
A memorandum from the Executive Officer of the
College, addressed to the Commandant, dated 8 October
1954, on the subject "A Study of Graduates, 1954," offers
the tentative conclusion that from one-half to three-
quarters of the military graduates may expect promotion to
flag or general rank. Subsequent experience tends to sub-
stantiate this conclusion.





Admiral, when twelve of twenty-eight selectees were gradu-
12
ates of the College*
III. FACULTY AND ADMINISTRATION
An original decision at the founding of the College,
and one which draws considerable criticism from various
quarters from time to time, is that the command responsi-
bility for the College is shared by the three military
13
services on a rotation basis* A vice admiral of the
Navy, a lieutenant general of the Army, and a lieutenant
general of the Air Force serve three-year terms succes-
sively; and, in the summer of 1964, after eighteen years
in existence, the College began a third round of this
rotational procedure* Below the Commandant, three Deputy
Commandants serve* Each of the two military services,
12Register of Commissioned and Warrant Officers of
the United states Navy and Marine* Corps and Reserve
Officers on Active Duty , 1 January 19fa4 , NavPers 15018
(Washington : The Government Printing Office, 1964).
13One of the most recent criticisms is a minority
point of view expressed in the 1962 report of the Board of
Consultants, favoring a term of years which would provide
additional continuity of leadership, and expressing the
view that the Commandants position might well be filled
by either a military or civilian leader* National War
College, Board of Consultants Report Supplement to The
Commandant's Annual Report , T9^1-62 (Washington: The
National War College, 1962), pp. TP9.
> ban
al ,e
ilmbs. A • *?
ft "3
D1B06 11 £d ^38.
14
other than that of the incumbent Commandant, is repre-
sented by a Deputy Commandant, one of whom acts as Deputy
for Academic Affairs, and the other as Deputy for Military
Affairs* The post of Deputy Commandant for Foreign
Affairs is filled by a senior Foreign Service Officer,
usually of the rank of Ambassador.
The full-time faculty consists of about twenty
persons. As of June 30, 1964, there were four Army offi-
cers, five Navy officers, one Marine officer, and six Air
Force officers making up the military segment of the
faculty. In addition, there were two Foreign Service
Officers and three civilians from the academic community
in the group. An administrative staff of six military
officers and about seventy-five civilians provided serv-
ices and housekeeping facilities.
An undoubted weak point in the organization is the
fact that there is an annual turnover of one-third to one-
14half of the faculty. There are no permanent members.
The military faculty members serve from two to four years;
the Foreign Service Officers, two or three years; and the
civilian academicians, either one or two years. Lack of
14
This is a perennial item in the annual Comman-
dant's Report and is frequently alluded to in the report
of the Board of Consultants.
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continuity over a five-year period is thus complete and
must be accepted as a handicap.
It should be explained here that the term "faculty"
is an almost complete misnomer. In the sense that a
faculty member's raison d ' £tre is to instruct—that is, to
provide information, develop concepts and demonstrate rela-
tionships—the faculty of the National War College has, in
practice, never existed. As will be seen in Section V of
this Chapter, the primary duty of the faculty concerns it-
self with administration of the curriculum.
Civilian members of the faculty come directly from
colleges and universities on leave of absence. Their pro-
curement is a recurring problem, due to reluctance of
universities to release well-qualified men, as well as to
reluctance of the professors themselves to interrupt their
careers. A continuing and long-range program has been
instituted to obtain qualified professors, centered
largely on building up better relations and understanding
between the War College on one hand, and deans, college
officials, and faculty members of leading colleges and
universities on the other.
All of these shortcomings of the instructional









methods have been dealt with in a recent magazine arti-
16
cle. Dr. Katzenbach is uniquely well qualified to
comment on the National War College, since he not only is
a leading educator, but has served as Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for education and as a member of the
Board of Consultants of the National War College. His
criticisms of the service war college faculties is both
harsh and accurate.
Annually, in April, the nine-man Board of Consult-
ants holds its two-day meeting at the College. The Board,
members of which are appointed by the Commandant for a
three-year term to serve in an advisory capacity to the
College, consists of distinguished officers, civil offi-
17
cials, educators, and business leaders. The Board is
kept informed of the progress of the year's work through
the periodic receipt of the course syllabi, various Col-
lege publications, and the tentative outline of the
16Edward L. Katzenbach, "The Demotion of Profes-
sionalism at the War Colleges," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings , 745:34-41, March, 1?6?.
17For the 1961-62 academic year, the members were:
Mr. Hanson Baldwin;
General Alfred M. Gruenther, USA (Retired)
The Honorable Waldemar J. Gallman;
The Honorable Allen W. Dulles;
The Honorable U. Alexis Johnson;
Dr. Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr.;
The Honorable Prank Pace, Jr.;
General Thomas D. White, USAF (Retired); and










following year's work. During its actual visit, the
Board confers with staff, faculty, and students and ob-
serves the College in operation. The Commandant presents
a written report to the Board, which, in turn, makes a
18
written report to the Commandant. The latter usually
concerns itself with recommendations and observations on
such subjects as the faculty, facilities, curriculum, as
well as on much broader subjects, such as the mission of
the College.
IV. FACILITIES
A fair summary of the physical plant of the
National War College would be that it is in pleasant sur-
roundings, conveniently located and arranged, adequate in
size, but antiquated in a number of ways. The building in
which the College and all its facilities are housed is
located at Fort Lesley J. McNair, in southwest Washington.
Erected in 1909 as the home of the Army War College, the
building was used for that purpose until 1942 and, since
1946, has housed the National War College. Certain items
of modernization are needed to a considerable degree, but
the annual deferment of the Commandant's requests for
18This is not as cozy and private an arrangement as
it might appear, since both documents are circulated in




funds for such modernization has not had a crippling ef-
fect on the functioning of the College. Major improve-
ments are being made during the 1964-1965 school year.
A very strong branch of the facilities available to
the faculty and students of the College is the library.
Built up since 1946 on the foundation of the Army War
College library, it today consists of over three hundred
thousand volumes and files of over four hundred periodi-
cals. The services provided by the library staff are
exceptional, with much skilled assistance available in
preliminary research effort. With a total user popula-
tion of students and faculty of about 160, there are 25
full-time library employees, 17 of whom are of profes-
sional rank. An evaluation report of the College in 1955
commented
:
Ordinarily when a library* s organization and manage-
ment are examined, it is relatively simple to make
recommendations aimed at improving service stand-
ards. • • • Arguing against this precedent and
experience is the library of the National War Col-
lege. A study ... convinced the Committee that
here was an unusually fine library facility, so fine
and so unusual, in fact, that to view its services
and resources constitutes a distinctive, new experi-
ence. 19
19
' Middle States Association of Colleges and Sec-
ondary Schools, Commission on Institutions of Higher
Education, Evaluation Report of the National War College








Central to the inquiry on which this paper is em-
barked is the need for a close look at the curriculum of
the College, What is being taught at the College? How is
the subject matter being presented? But before examining
the curriculum, it appears appropriate here to set out the
Mission of the National War College, as prescribed by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff:
To conduct a course of study of those agencies
and other military, economic, scientific, political,
psychological and social factors of power potential,
which are essential parts of national security, in
order to enhance the preparation of selected personnel
of the Armed Forces and State Department for the
exercise of joint and combined high level policy,
command and staff functions and for the planning of
national strategy*
Organization of the Instruction
The academic program of the College is divided into
a series of courses, each of which occupies about one
month of the ten-month school year. The courses, which
are discussed below briefly, are under continuous, year-to-
year review. The concept set out below reflects the
organization of the curriculum during the 1962-1963 school
year.
Course One . "Introduction and World Situation."
The course seeks to develop an understanding of the general




emphasis on those forces which pose problems to United
States security. An attempt is made to identify the main
forces with which United States policy must be concerned,
followed by a consideration of the objectives and vital
interests of the United States, of its major allies, and
of the Soviet Union.
Course Two . "Factors of the National Power With
Particular Reference to the United States." A study is
made of the various elements of national power which
underlie a nation* s strength, including such tangible
factors as geography, demography, government, science and
technology, education and military strength, and such less
tangible factors as national character, political ideology,
and leadership. Special consideration is given to alli-
ances and coalitions. A direct evaluation is made of the
power position of the United States in the areas above,
together with an evaluation of such additional factors as
the United States economy, United States labor and manage-
ment, and space technology. The United Nations Organiza-
tion is studied and a trip made to its headquarters.
Course Three . "The Formulation of United States
National Security Policy." The purpose of this course is
to provide an understanding of the governmental machinery
concerned with the development of United States national











operates, and the major problems involved. Attention is
directed to the role of the major components of the Execu-
tive Branch of the Government in the formulation of such
policy. An examination is made of the agencies and the
organizational structure through which pertinent factors
are evaluated and policy recommendations advanced. The
special role of military considerations in the formulation
of national security policy is examined. The part played
by the Legislative Branch is also considered. In this
segment of the course, the relationships and interactions
between the Legislative and Executive Branches of the
Government are brought into view. The course also in-
cludes some consideration of the United States political
party system, intelligence matters, and the problem of
financing national security.
Course Four . "Strategy and Warfare." The objec-
tive is to examine the application of United States
national power throughout the entire spectrum of warfare.
Emphasis is placed on (1) the military capabilities re-
quired to implement national security policy, and (2) the
impact of science and technology on strategy. The course
begins with a field trip to military establishments in the
United States. The course assesses the impact of nuclear
energy on United States military strategy, including con-





plenty. The course also examined United States missile
programs, and studies the impact of space technology on
international relations. The current United States and
Soviet military strategies and capabilities to cope with
both general and limited war are examined in detail. Also
considered are the theory and application of deterrence,
the reduction and control of armaments, and such other
forms of conflict as economic warfare, psychological ac-
tivities, and foreign assistance.
Course Five . "The Communist States." The course
is concerned with world communism and its power base, the
USSR. Its purpose is to study communism and the communist
states, their strengths and weaknesses, and the nature of
their threat to the United States. After an examination
of the theoretical foundations and operational concepts of
communism, an assessment is made of the elements of com-
munist power. The focus is first on the USSR as a world
power and the leader of the communist bloc, and then turns
to the European satellites, Communist China, and the inter-
national communist movement outside the Soviet bloc. Also
included is an examination of internal communist subversion
in the United States.
Course Six . "Free Europe and the Western Hemis-
phere." The course is concerned with those nations of
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the United States* The course covers, in part, European
political parties and attitudes, European integration and
economic development, the North Atlantic Alliance, NATO
military strategy, and certain member nations of the
Alliance. The course also covers the economic, social,
and political problems of Latin America and surveys its
role in the Free World. The purposes of the course are
to analyze conditions in Free Europe and the Western Hemi-
sphere, and evaluate the impact of the countries within
these areas upon the foreign and national security poli-
cies of the United States.
Course Seven . "Africa and Free Asia." The purpose
of this course is to study the major forces at work, and
to analyze the principal problems existing in Africa and
the non-communist states of Asia as a basis for formulat-
ing United States national security policy. The course
evaluates the strategic, economic, and political importance
of Africa, and assesses the role the region can play in
international affairs. It then considers the interrela-
tionships between the various Middle Eastern countries.
The principal problems and trends that confront the states
of South and Southeast Asia in their quest for political
stability and economic development are investigated. The
military and political factors of Free World security in
the Middle East and East Asia are analyzed. Finally, a
-
24
comparison is made of the United States and communist
policies toward the states of Afro-Asia,
Course Eight . "Overseas Studies—An Appraisal of
Implementation of National Security Policy in Strategic
Areas." The purpose of this course is fourfold: First,
to increase the understanding and knowledge of each member
of the class by affording him the opportunity to study, on
the spot, political, economic, and military situations in
overseas areas, with particular reference to their impact
on the objectives and policies of the United States;
second, to permit members of the class to observe at first
hand the actual implementation of United States policy;
third, upon return, to disseminate to the entire college
an evaluation of current national security policy and its
implementation, based on the observations made on the
respective trips; and fourth, to provide first-hand knowl-
edge of areas where communist "wars of liberation" are
possible, as a basis for detailed study of counter-
insurgency in Course Nine, and to utilize these evalua-
tions in the development of national security policy and
strategy in Course Ten. Each group (the class is divided
into five groups, each of which visits an area of the
world) is assigned major problems concerning United States
national security interest in the area visited, with the
task of appraising United States policy. Upon their return








to the College, the groups prepare and present a brief of
their visit setting forth the conclusions reached as a
result of experience gained during the trip.
Course Nine . "Counterinsurgency." The purpose of
this course is to conduct an intensive study of the enemy
strategy and tactics in promoting and conducting insur-
gency; to examine the capabilities of the United States
and its friends for countering such insurgency; to develop
policies and principles for conducting counterinsurgency
operations, and the requirements of close coordination
between the military and civilian agencies, both at the
policy and the country team level.
Course Ten . "National Security Policy, National
Strategy and Implementing Plans." The class, working now
in committees, applies the work of the preceding courses
to develop a national security policy and a national
strategy. The course consists of two closely-related
parts. In the first, the committees prepare a national
security policy paper which could be a basis of a Presi-
dential directive to departments of the Executive Branch
of the Government responsible for national security mat-
ters. As a preliminary step, United States national objec-
tives are defined. Based on this policy, in part two, the
committees develop a national strategy and implementing






for specific countries where insurgency is or could be a
problem, or where the United States has vital strategic
interests* Some of the committees are assigned the task
of preparing a military strategy and military plans at the
20JCS level. Consideration is given to budgetary require-
ments, domestic support, and governmental organization
necessary to implement the national security policy and
str.tegy. 21
Methods of Instruction
In implementing the curriculum, much reliance is
placed on lectures by visiting speakers. Because of the
national importance and prestige of the National War
College, it has been possible to maintain, over the years,
an extremely high quality of guest lecturers. The usual
day commences with a lecture, followed by an extended
question period. For these presentations, well-qualified
20
The joint nature of the College is well illus-
trated by the details of Course Ten. Not only are mili-
tary officers being mentally exercised with problems
usually thought of as within the civilian purview, but
here strictly military matters are being dealt with by
committees, the composition of which are, on the average,
one-fourth civilian.
21
* Details of the courses have been abridged from
The National War College , 1962-63 , a publication of the
College prepared as an indoctrination manual for the
incoming class (Washington: The National War College,
1962), pp. 15-26. Hereafter cited as NWC 1962-63 .
io aaufisoa .aisol»©q« (






speakers are obtained, including prominent figures in
public life, recognized academic specialists from this
country and abroad, career diplomats, and military leaders,
and a sprinkling of journalists, business executives,
22labor leaders, and clergymen*
The students are expected to complete daily and
weekly reading assignments, but the separate courses of
the curriculum are built around the lectures, and the
information and interpretations presented by the speakers
most frequently form the jumping off point for subsequent
discussion* Lectures are scheduled on an average of three
or four days a week, and special pains are taken to insure
in advance that the substance of each lecture will mesh
with the daily topics on which reading has been assigned.
The greatest possible emphasis is placed on assur-
ance to speakers that their remarks will be treated as
privileged. In addition to being protected by the appro-
priate security classification, the speaker is repeatedly
reminded that what he says will be safeguarded by the War
22
' As an illustration, the following names are
listed in the first two pages of the alphabetical list of
lecturers at the College for the three years 1955-1958:
Dean Acheson, Mohammed Ali, George Allen, Herve Alphand,
Stewart Alsop, Robert Amory, Dillon Anderson, Hanson
Baldwin, Samuel F. Bemis. National War College, A Three
Year Record of the Courses of the National War CoTleqe for
the Academic Years 1955/56 To T5TT7/58 (Washington: Na-
tionaT^7ar~^oTIe^e,'~r^5r§T7 Section A, pp. 1-2.




23College tradition of no quotation or attribution. As a
result, some extremely frank and candid statements are
heard from lecturers, especially from those in Government
positions, and in response to questions from the student
audience.
A truly important and significant part of the in-
struction is the emphasis on the committee system. The
class is divided into committees of six to eight members,
in such a way that each committee represents a cross sec-
tion of views and experience. Committees are reconsti-
tuted periodically, with the result that each student
serves as a committee chairman, and each student serves as
a fellow member on a committee with most other students.
Committee problems are assigned fairly frequently
during the year, mostly on an assigned basis, but occa-
sionally as a surprise. The problems are related to the
subject matter of the course being studied at the time
and represent the type of problem which might well be
under current consideration in various agencies of the
Government. A written solution is required, but the
method of approach, scope of the solution, and format are
left to each group. There is no "school solution" to any
23National War College, Information for Guest













problem at the National War College, but a faculty com-
mittee selects on the basis of appropriateness and inter-
est, certain papers for oral presentation to the entire
class* Following each presentation, sufficient time is
allotted to permit other committees an opportunity to
24
challenge the conclusions of the presenting committee.
An individual research paper is required of each
student. A systematic and analytic study of some subject
related to national security is followed by a paper which
the College hopefully expects will measure up in quality
to the standards of university graduate work. In choosing
subjects, students are encouraged to select one about
which their beginning knowledge is far from that of an
25
expert. The finished papers vary widely in quality,
just as do the educational backgrounds of the students;
but, in any event, the ability of the student to make
critical analyses has been improved.
Field Trips
Throughout the history of the College, field trips
24*
*NWC 1962-6 3 , 0£. cit . , p. 33.
25
"The Committee read a number of the individual
research study papers. They vary enormously in degrees of
excellence. Some of them are clearly of master's thesis
quality. Many of them are comparable to good course
papers in an undergraduate institution. A few of them are
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have formed an important part of the school year* Al-
though the practice has varied from year to year, a
typical class has an October trip of two days to United
Nations headquarters in New York, a week in December tour-
ing military installations in the United States, and a
three-week trip in March to one of five areas of the world.
The three-week trip abroad is not only one of the
most enjoyable facets of the course, but actually is con-
sidered one of the most valuable. The trip is a kind of
traveling seminar, and elaborate pains are taken by the
College in planning and scheduling, to ensure an educa-
tional experience of value. The trip taken by the writer
in 1959 was fairly typical. In Tunisia, Pakistan, India,
and Israel, there was an opportunity for the members of
the class to talk informally with the political head of
government. In the other countries visited (Iran, Lebanon,
Greece, Turkey, Sudan, and Portugal), briefings and con-
versations were authoritative and more than adequate. In
each country, the United States Ambassador and his staff
attempted, with great sincerity, to impart to the students








THE LOCATION OF THE GRADUATES
There have been 2,238 graduates of this "double-
domed finishing school for the elite of the senior
officers corps," through the graduates of 1964. Of that
2
number, about 1,700 remain in active government service.
An effort will be made at this point to look at
three activities in Washington in which are located siz-
able numbers of these active duty graduates. By thus
precisely locating a number of graduates and by including
in addition a sampling of other governmental jobs held by
graduates, it is hoped that inferences and conclusions
regarding their influence on foreign policy may be pos-
sible in subsequent pages.
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)
This Office is organized in seven divisions, below
the top-ranking Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) and
1Hewsweek , No. 59, March 12, 1962, p. 95.
2There were a small number of Canadian and British
military officers in the first four classes. They par-
ticipated fully, but had the status of "observers" and are
not included in the College statistics as "graduates." It
is interesting to note that twenty-one of the twenty-two
"observers" have been promoted to flag or general rank.









his principal Deputy Assistant Secretary. In six of the
3
seven divisions, graduates of the College occupy promi-
nent positions.
The Director of Military Assistance, General
Robert J. Wood, USA, heads the largest division, and is
himself a graduate of the College. The Deputy Director
of Military Assistance for Plans and Programs, Brigadier
General G. E. Pinkston, USAP, is a graduate, as is the
Assistant Deputy Director, Mr. Milton H. Blick. The Plans
and Analysis Branch of this Division is headed by another
graduate, Captain Lodwick H. Alford, USN, and in the
Programs Branch is Lieutenant Colonel Robert Hixon, USA.
In addition, Mr. David W. Quant is the Chief of the
Organization and Training Branch.
In the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary
(Planning and North Atlantic Affairs), two of the three
Special Project Directors are graduates, Mr. Robert S.
Mandelstam and Mr. Harry Schwartz. The latter is a
Foreign Service Officer on loan to Defense. Also on duty
in this Division are two Project Officers of the Policy
Planning Staff, Mr. Albert Toner and Colonel Laurence J.
Legere, USA. In the European Branch, Brigadier General
3
Telephone Directory, OASD (ISA), undated, but








J. T. Polda, Jr., USA, is Director, and Mr. William Smith
is his Deputy, while Captain James G. Andrews, USN, is
assistant for the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Canada.
All are graduates of the College.
Under the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western
4Hemisphere, Foreign Economic Affairs, and Far East, the
Deputy Director of Foreign Economic Affairs, Mr. Charles K.
Nichols, is a civilian graduate. In the Far East Direc-
torate are located Colonel Austin L. Berry, USAF, and
Captain Jon Boyes, USN.
The Deputy Assistant Secretary vNESA and MAP Policy
Review), Mr. Townsend W. Hoopes, is himself a graduate, as
is the Director for NESA, Brigadier General E. L. Strick-
land, USAF, and the Deputy Director, Mr. Jonathan D. Stod-
dart. Located in this Division is a Board of Consultants,
composed of five retired flag or general officers. Four
of these five are graduates: Lieutenant General William
P. Ennis, USA (retired) 5 Major General John M. Breit, USAF
(retired); Major General R. E. Lindquist, USA (retired);
an- Major General J. J. O'Hara, USAF (retired).
Finally, a graduate, Colonel Joe M. Whitfield, USAF,
4The Office of ASD (ISA) has recently been reorgan-
ized into divisions with names such as this, with the
obvious intention of making most of the Deputy Assistant







is serving as Military Assistant to the Deputy Assistant
Secretary (Africa and Foreign Military Rights), and
another, Mr. Arvin Kraraish, is an Assistant Director for
Arras Control.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff
There are fifty-five military graduates on duty
with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff. It
is considered especially significant here that, of the
Joint Chiefs themselves, four of the five incumbents are
5graduates of the College. In the Joint Staff, the direc-
tor of the staff itself, and the directors of J-l, J-3,
and J-4 are graduates, as well as the deputy director of
J-5.
In addition to occupying directing positions, the
concentration of graduates within certain directorates is
significant to this study. There are nineteen graduates
in J-5 (plans and policy directorate), and twelve in J-3
(operations directorate). In contrast, only one graduate
each is assigned to the sizable J-l (personnel), J-4 (logis-
tics), and J-6 (communications-electronics) directorates.
5General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, Chairman, a 1950
graduate; Admiral David L. McDonald, USN, Chief of Naval
Operations, a 1951 graduate; General Harold K. Johnson,
USA, Chief of Staff, USA, and General Wallace M. Greene,
Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, both graduates in
1953. The Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Edwin J.









The Department of State
The August, 1963, Department of State alphabetical
telephone directory lists a total of eighty-five National
War College graduates in the Washington headquarters. Of
these, sixty occupy positions identifiable in the organi-
zational portion of the directory. Below are listed, not
in order of importance, some of the more significant job
titles among the sixty:
Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department;
Deputy Director of the Operations Center;
Director General of the Foreign Service;
Inspector General, Foreign Service Inspection
Corps
;
Members, Policy Planning Council (two);
Director, Office of Research and Analysis, Soviet
Bloc;
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and
Cultural Affairs;
Executive Director, Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs;
Deputy Director, Office of North African Affairs;
Director, Office of Eastern and Southern African
Affairs;
Director, Office of West Coast and Kalian Affairs;
Director, Office of African and Malagasy Union
Affairs;
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs;









Director of German Affairs;
Director of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs;
Director of Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs;
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Far Eastern Affairs;
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs;
Director, Office of International Conferences;
Chief, Personnel Policy and Planning Staff;
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Economic Affairs;
Deputy Assistant Administrator for Politico/Military
Affairs (AID)
Other Influential Graduates
Prom the 1964 directory of graduates of the National
War College, the lists below have heen compiled, repre-
senting a sampling of other significant positions occupied
by graduates. This is merely a cross-section of the more
impressive titles:
Military ;
Military Aide to the President of the United States;
Commander in Chief, U.S. Strike Command;
Director of Operations, U.S. Air Force;
President, Naval War College;
Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense;
National War College, Directory , Staff and Gradu-
ates of the National War College , 1964 (Washington; The




Commander In Chief, Pacific;
Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Pacific;
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet;
Commanding General, Berlin;
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe;
Many military, naval, and air attaches; most






































Assistant Deputy Director (Policy and Plans), USIA;
Director, Berlin Task Force, USIA;
Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency
j
Political Advisors to
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic?
Commander in Chief, Atlantic;
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe;
Commander in Chief, Southern Europe
Executive Secretary, National Security Council.
(fifL6.
CHAPTER IV
INFLUENCE ON FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION
As was mentioned in Chapter I, much of the evidence
pertaining to influence must be circumstantial. Foreign
policy is of such substance that its formulation must be
by accretion and accumulation, and participation of many
actors. Very rarely can it be said that a recognizable
fragment of United States foreign policy was entirely
formulated by a single person—and then probably only by
the President.
The specific questions of who formulates foreign
policy in the United States Government, and through what
process the formulation is accomplished, have been asked
An Army general officer, serving as Deputy Chief
of Staff, Unit Training and Readiness, Headquarters U.S.
Continental Army Command, in answering the question on
whether he felt he had had any influence on the formula-
tion of U.S. foreign policy (see Chapter V) recognized
this distinction. "... influence on anything is often
subtle or gradual. I served as Assistant to the Chairman
of the JCS in 1957-59. In assisting him in the prepara-
tion of speeches, congressional testimony, and other
matters, I feel I had an influence on the formulation of
his views, and through them, on the formulation of some
aspects of foreign policy. I then served as Deputy G-3
of US Army Pacific, and through the development of plans
for the SE Asia and Pacific areas, and comments to CinCPac
feel again that I had a degree of influence on foreign
policy. In my present assignment, again through develop-
ment of plans for both CINCLANT and CINCSTRIKE, I feel






and examined in detail many times. It is not appropriate
or necessary here to attempt a detailed study of the
subject. A summary is needed, however, to provide the
setting in which to locate the War College graduates who
are the subject of inquiry.
There can be no doubt of the pre-eminent position
of the President as a leader in foreign affairs. The
President has at his disposal an imposing set of powers,
bestowed by the Constitution, by legislative grant, by
custom and understanding, and by court decisions. He may
negotiate agreements with foreign powers, recognize new
states and governments, act as commander-in-chief of the
Armed Forces, and nominate or appoint officials, to name
only a few of his powers. Along with this very consider-
able power has come a growth of responsibility. "Respon-
sibility in this context means basically that there is a
sanctioned expectation that the President will act, must
2
act, and has the power to act for the nation."
Because of the subject of this paper, the not in-
considerable role of the Legislative Branch of the
Government in foreign policy formulation will be disre-
garded. No graduate of the National War College has been
2Richard C. Snyder and Edgar S. Furniss, Jr.,
American Foreign Policy ; Formulation t Principles , and
Programs (New York: Rinehart & Company" 1954 J , p. 183.










identified in the Legislative Branch, except for several
3
military officers engaged in legislative liaison.
The President, as head of the Executive Branch of
the Government, has literally millions of assistants. In
the Executive Office of the President, the more influen-
tial centers of foreign policy decision making are
probably in the National Security Council, the White House
Office, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Other activi-
ties of the Executive Office with an influence in foreign
policy are the Bureau of the Budget, the Council of
Economic Advisors, the National Aeronautics and Space
Council, the Office of Emergency Planning, the Office of
Science and Technology, and the Office of the Special
Representative for Trade Negotiations.
In the executive establishment, the Department of
State is, of course, "the major single source of foreign
4policy decisions in the entire governmental structure."
The detailed procedure used in formulating foreign policy
5in the Department is too complicated for inclusion here.
3Although Captain John Litchfield, Royal Navy
(Retired), a 1948 "observer," is a Conservative Member of
Parliament for a London suburban area.
4Charles 0. Lerche, Jr., Foreign Policy of the
American People (second edition; Englewood Cliff's", New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), p. 64.
For "complicated," some critics of the Department
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A paper by Charlton Ogburn, Jr., entitled "The Flow of
gPolicymaking in the Department of State," gives a lively
series of examples of the interplay between offices and
officials of the Department.
One other executive department looms large in
foreign policy making. Military considerations have,
since 1945, had an increasingly important and increasingly
integrated significance in foreign policy. American
policy must be based in part on military judgment in
today's world, and the Department of Defense has a direct
share in the foreign policy process at many levels. Two
centers of power in this process are most evident: the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, as principal military advisors to
the President, to the National Security Council, and to
the Secretary of Defense; and the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (International Security Affairs), the functions of
whose office have been likened to a "Department of State
for the Pentagon."
I. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
From the foregoing, it may be seen that the proof
c
Charlton Ogburn, Jr., "The Flow of Policymaking in
the Department of State," Appendix C to H. Field Haviland,
Jr
•
, The Formulation and Administration of United States
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of a considerable influence, as defined in this paper's
title, would be much eased if the President himself, or a
considerable number of his close and influential advisors
in the Executive Office of the President were graduates of
the College. Such, of course, is not the case. Many of
those close to the President are political appointees,
while many others have not had the pattern of government
service from which National War College students are drawn,
In spite of these factors, it is possible to identify sev-
eral graduates in responsible and influential positions.
In the White House Office itself, the Military Aide
to the President, Major General Chester V. Clifton, USA,
is a graduate. No one would argue that his influence with
the President in foreign affairs approaches that of, for
instance, Mr. Bundy. The relationships between the Presi-
7dent and his service aides, however, are personal ones;
and, depending on the desires and inclination of the
incumbent President, there is a considerable possibility
Q
for significant peripheral influence by these officers.
One position of potential extreme influence filled
by a National War College graduate is that of Executive
7Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (Garden
City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 262-263.
Q
Interview with Captain Edward L. Beach, U.S. Navy,
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Secretary of the National Security Council. The Honorable
Bromley K. Smith attended the College under a State Depart-
ment quota in 1951-1952, While it is true that the
National Security Council has probably had a declining
role in its intended function over the past years of the
Democratic Administration, it has had in the past, and
undoubtedly will have in the future, a most vital role in
foreign policy. Its function is
• • • to advise the President with respect to the
integration of domestic, foreign, and military
policies relating to the National Security so as
to enable the military services and the other
departments and agencies of the Government to
cooperate more effectively in matters involving the
national security.
^
The Executive Secretary to a group functioning in accord-
ance with the quoted mission, it is submitted, is truly a
power center In foreign policy formation. 10
The Bureau of the Budget has participated to a very
limited degree in furnishing students for the National War
College. Only six of its employees have attended over the
9Office of the Federal Register, National Archives
and Records Service, General Services Administration,
United States Government Organization Manual , 1963-64
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), p.~T6.
Hereafter cited as G. 0. Manual .
See Burton M. Sapin, "The Organization and Proce-
dures of the National Security Council Mechanism," which
is Appendix B to H. Field Haviland, Jr., 0£. cit .
ft*









years, of whom four remain in government service, and none
of whom is in a top policy-making position in the Bureau,
Elsewhere in the Executive Office of the President, there
is a Foreign Service Officer graduate serving as Special
Assistant in the Office of Science and Technology, and two
other graduates serving as Special Assistants for Economic
Affairs in the Office of Emergency Planning.
The imponderable in this area is the Central Intel-
ligence Agency. The Deputy Director, Lieutenant General
Marshall S. Carter, USA, is a graduate. Below his level,
information is hard to get, and understandably so. The
facts at hand, however, show that there have been thirty-
seven CIA graduates since 1949, of whom thirty-five remain
11in service as of June, 1962. One would suppose that
many of these graduates hold key positions of great respon-
sibility in the Agency, as do their service and State
Department contemporaries, but unclassified information
12
on the subject is not obtainable.
"rfational War College, The Commandant * s Annual
Report, 1961-62 (Washington: The National War College,
12It has been interesting to follow the changeable
policy of the College authorities in identifying the CIA
graduates in the annual Directory of Graduates. The
November, 1959, Directory, in which the writer *s class
first appeared, listed the three CIA graduates of that
class in the same format as other graduates, but gave no
indication of their duties. In 1962, the Directory
.-
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XX. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
From the examples listed in Section XXX of Chapter
III, it nay be seen that, below the level of offices held
principally by political appointees, graduates of the
College appear prominently. Xn the geographic bureaus,
whose heads (Assistant Secretaries) have been referred to
13
as "obviously key people in the flow of policy decision,"
the representation of graduates is especially heavy.
Twenty-three graduates work in these five bureaus in
important billets, including Deputy Assistant Secretaries
in three of the bureaus.
A considerable influence of the National War Col-
lege is felt in the Policy Planning Council, where the
executive Secretary and two of the members are graduates.
As in the case of the National Security Council, the
Policy Planning Council has been criticised for failure to
underwent a purge » and the result was that there was no
hint that any CXA employee had ever attended the National
war College. In the case of the Class of 1959, this
development was especially disconcerting, since the Class
President was one of those who had apparently disappeared.
A final twist came in November, 1964, when the Directory
appeared listing only one of the three CXA graduates of
the class of 1959 as a graduate, although the format of
the Directory provides for continued listing of all
graduates, even though retired or deceased.






14live up to its potential, but it retains not inconsider-
able policy formulation influence.
Among America's representatives abroad, both those
sponsored by the Department of State and other non-
military assigned by independent agencies, such as the
United States Information Service, is a strong representa-
tion of War College graduates. The thirty-one Ambassadors
have been mentioned previously. In almost every mission
abroad there are one or more graduates, typically serving
as Deputy Chief of Mission, Counselor of Embassy, Minister
Counselor, Political Counselor, or Public Affairs Officer.
Admittedly, these graduates function more importantly in
the field of policy implementation, but their influence in
policy formulation, while more often indirect, is consid-
15
arable.
III. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The inclusion of the military point of view in
American foreign policy making has been a significant item
during the past two decades. More and more, that point of
14 d., p. 70 j and Snyder and Furniss, op_. cit .
,
pp. 281-283.
15This conclusion is implicit in a reading of
Charlton Ogburn, Jr., "The Flow of Policymaking in the












view has come from the Department of Defense, rather than
from the more traditional sources of the two (or three)
services. In the Department of Defense, who speaks on, or
has a special influence on foreign policy making?
First of all, certainly the Secretary of Defense
himself and his immediate staff. He is the principal
assistant to the President in all matters relating to the
Department of Defense, and serves as a Cabinet member, a
member of the National Security Council, and a member of
the North Atlantic Council. Both his principal military
assistant, Major General George S. Brown, USAF, and the
principal military assistant to the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, Colonel Francis J. Roberts, USA, are graduates
of the National War College.
Secondly, the real center of foreign policy influ-
ence within the Department of Defense is in the office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security
16Affairs). As was demonstrated in Section I of Chapter
His functions include: (1) monitoring Department
of Defense participation in National Security Council
affairs, including development, coordination, and recom-
mendation of the positions of and the provision of staff
support for the Defense member on the Council; (2) con-
ducting such political-military planning studies as the
Secretary of Defense from time to time may direct; (3)
initiating appropriate actions and measures within the
Department of Defense for implementing approved National
Security Council policies; (4) developing and coordinating
Defense positions, policies, plans, and procedures in the













III, there are fifteen graduates of the College serving in
this Office in responsible positions.
Third, the viewpoint of the uniformed services
comes to the Secretary of Defense and thus enters the
foreign policy stream, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
their principal assistants, the Joint Staff. It is in
these two organizations that graduates of the National
War College are most numerous in proportion to the total
personnel, there being fifty-seven graduates in key
positions among the five to six hundred officers attached
economic affairs, including disarmament, of interest to
the Department of Defense and with respect to negotiating
and monitoring of agreements with foreign governments and
international organizations on military facilities,
operating rights, status of forces, and other interna-
tional politico-military affairs j (5) providing policy
guidance, as appropriate, to Department of Defense repre-
sentatives on United States missions and to international
organizations and conferences; (6) developing, coordinating
and establishing Department of Defense positions, plans,
and procedures pertaining to the Military Assistance pro-
gram, and supervising, administering, and directing the
Military Assistance Program and other activities of in-
terest to the Department of Defense under the Mutual
Security Program; (7) planning, organizing, and monitor-
ing the activities of the Military Advisory Assistance
Groups, including joint United States military advisory
groups and training missions insofar as they concern
military assistance functions; and (8) evaluating the
administration and management of approved policies and
programs. In the performance of his functions, he coor-
dinates actions, as appropriate, with the military depart-
ments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other Department of
Defense agencies having collateral or related functions,
and coordinates relations between the Department of Defense
and the Department of State in the field of his assigned







to the two organizations. As to influence on foreign
policy formulation, it is necessary to differentiate be-
tween two aspects of the "influence." Theoretically, the
advice of the Joint Chiefs is purely professional and
technical, and concerns itself only with military feasi-
18bility and/or military consequences. If this theoreti-
cal role were strictly accurate, the Joint Chiefs, as
spokesmen for the military, would have a comparatively
minor role in policy making. There is a widespread
belief, however, that the military voice goes much farther
in the American Government. Indeed, it may be argued that
military advice as it comes to the civilian policy makers
should have already built into it an accounting of social,
19
economic, and political factors. The military graduates
of the National War College would appear, at least, to be
prepared, through training, for furnishing this sort of
advice and functioning in this sort of role.
A word, finally, about the role of the three serv-
ices themselves. All three services have specifically
17Although the Joint Staff is limited by law to a
maximum of four hundred officers, the larger number re-
ferred to results from what appears to be a variety of
subterfuges employed to exceed that limit.
Lerche, o£. cit
• , p. 72.





designated units or officers responsible for international
affairs. In the Department of the Array, under the Deputy
Under Secretary of the Army (International Affairs), the
senior military officer is the Chief, International
Affairs, who is a National War College graduate. The Air
Staff includes an International Affairs Division, and the
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations includes a Politico-
Military Policy Division, and in each of these, several




Having tried to show by the nature of the position
currently held, how the graduates are influencing foreign
policy formulation, an attempt is made to introduce
opinion of the graduates as a factor leading to conclu-
sions on degree of influence. There were 150 questlon-
1 2
naires prepared and mailed to as many selected graduates.
There were replies from 107, with many of the more senior
individuals proving most helpful by providing detailed
answers.
A copy of the complete questionnaire and the for-
warding letter may be seen in Appendix A.
2It was considered that a random sampling would be
wasteful of the questionnaire. It is fairly obvious from
the background and present positions of some graduates
that they have never had any opportunity for influence in
the foreign policy field. In addition, graduates of the
first four classes are almost all retired, and graduates
of the five most recent classes were considered too junior,
on the whole, to have had much influence. Having narrowed
the field to the ten years 1950-1959, inclusive, it was
further determined that nineteen questionnaires per class
would give an accurately representative sampling of the
class (five Army, five Air Force, four Navy, one Marine
Corps, and four civilians). In order to limit the total
mailing to 150, the classes of 1953 and 1957 were arbi-
trarily eliminated, and the most junior class, 1959, was
reduced to seventeen. In deciding upon individuals within
each group to whom to address the questionnaire, the general
rule followed was to select the most senior, on the theory
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I. THE QUESTIONS
The questionnaire, limited to one typewritten sheet
to attempt to avoid intimidating the recipients, asked
three principal questions, to be answered "yes " or "no."
Each of the principal questions was followed up by one or
two subordinate requests for elaboration. The recipient
of the questionnaire was asked to identify himself and was
invited to extend his answers and remarks on the reverse
side of the answer sheet.
The first question went to the heart of the re-
search effort, asking "do you feel that you are serving or
have served, subsequent to attendance at the National War
College, in any assignment in which you had any influence
3
on formulation of U. S. foreign policy?" As a follow-up
to that question, the recipient was asked that, if he
answered "yes , " in what positions had he had an influence,
and elaboration was requested.
3The word "formulation" bothered some of those fill-
ing out the questionnaire, but it is considered, on reflec-
tion, that any substituted word would have had a similar
effect. A Major General, U. S. Army, commented, "I must
start off with a comment on your word 'formulation.' The
way the question is phrased it would indicate that some-
body formulates policy from on high and passes it on down
to the guy in the field to execute. I think this picture
is wrong. Actually, what happens is that ideas spring up
from guys in the field carrying out policy and from other
guys who review their actions. So, in my opinion, execu-
tion of policy must include elements of formulation."
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Almost equally crucial to the inquiry was whether
the graduate, if he has had an influence, has had a dif-
ferent influence due to his having attended the College,
Accordingly, the second question asked "if you answered
yes to the first question, do you feel that your attend-
ance at National War College made a difference in your
contribution to foreign policy formulation?" If this
question was answered affirmatively, the recipient was
asked to describe "in what way your NWC experience made
such a difference.
"
Finally, the question was asked "has any particular
phase of the NWC course been especially helpful to you in
the foreign policy field?" and "If yes, what phase?" It
was hoped, in this manner, to provide a check on the
answers to the second question, by pinpointing inconsist-
encies; but analysis of the returned questionnaires showed
the answers to the third question to be of little value*
II. THE ANSWERS
By a better than two and one-half to one ratio,
those who returned the questionnaire gave an affirmative
answer to whether they felt they had had an influence on
formulation of U. S. foreign policy. Every one of the 107
answered that question, with 78 replying "yes " and 29, "no."
am b&






In general, it is considered that the positions in
which the individuals felt they had wielded some influence
are plausibly cited. Some random examples listed by the
graduates are: "Staff Assistant to the Special Assistant
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for National Security Council
Affairs, Joint Staff, Pentagon"; "Deputy Chief of Staff,
Plans and Programs, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps";
"Chief, International Affairs, Office Secretary of the
Army"; "Executive Officer to the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs"; and "Ambassa-
dor to Cyprus." On the other hand, there were a few who
took a narrow view of the question. A Lieutenant General,
U. S. Army, reported that he had been assigned, since
graduation from the College, to a Combat Command of an
armored division in Germany, as Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations of the 7tb Army in Germany, as a Division Com-
mander in Korea, and as Deputy Chief of Legislative Liaison
(among other positions). He followed this list of assign-
ments with the observation, "as you can see from the above,
my involvement in the formulation of foreign policy has
been nil." At the other extreme, at first glance, one
might question the position "Director of Military Person-
nel, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower)"
as being influential on U. S. foreign policy formulation.
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Working and helping to make policy in regard to
armed forces overseas, particularly with respect
to dependents overseas, flow of gold, PX and
Exchange policies on overseas purchases, purchases
by Armed Forces individuals and their dependents
of foreign made goods, tour lengths overseas, and
housing construction at overseas bases*
An answer to the first question is worthy of spe-
cial comment, A retired naval officer, now Ambassador to
a NATO country, listed these positions in which he had
been able to exert influence on policy formulation:
1. Staff, Commander SIXTH Fleet;
2. Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers
Europe
;
3. Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff j
4. Commander, Taiwan Defense Force;
5. Chief of Staff to Commander in Chief, Pacific
Fleet;
6. Commander, SIXTH Fleet;
7. Chief of Naval Operations and Member, Joint
Chiefs of Staff; and
8* Ambassador.
Surely, this is as imposing a set of credentials as one
could expect from any graduate; but, in elaboration, the
officer explained that he felt his role had been limited
and indirect, but nonetheless real to a degree.
A few officers questioned went to considerable















A Vice Admiral, USN, explained that he felt that he had
had foreign policy formulation influence in two positions
which he had held recently: Director of the Submarine
Warfare Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions; and as Director, Special Projects Office. In the
latter capacity, he was in charge of development, produc-
tion, and support of the POLARIS weapons system. He wrote
in elaboration;
While senior naval officers are frequently charged
with "implementation" of foreign policy, I believe
the two positions cited did put me in a position to
help "formulate" such policy. Since each is a top
position in charge of a unique aspect of national
defense, they put me on important inter-departmental
committees and gave me access to key officials and
executives in State, ACDA, and White House staff.
By being able to speak up with some authority on
submarine warfare, and the capabilities of the
POLARIS system in deterrence, I was able to influ-
ence or assist judgments of civilian policy makers
not experienced in military matters. A case in
point was my membership in a State Department study
group considering measures to prevent surprise
attack. Appearances before ACDA, and taking top
officials, including the President and the Secretary
of Defense, to sea to explain the working and reli-
ability of the POLARIS system, helped confirm their
reliance on nuclear deterrence in foreign policy.
As President Kennedy wrote to me after his trip,
"Once one has seen the firing of a POLARIS missile,
the efficacy of this system as a deterrent is not
debatable."
There was near unanimity in the answers to the
second question. Of the seventy-eight who felt they had
had some influence on formulation of U. S. foreign policy,
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had made a difference in their contribution, with only two
expressing the opposite view.
The answer of a Brigadier General, U. S. Array, to
this question seems to sum up fairly a frequently-expressed
viewpoint* After answering "yes " to the first question,
and citing the position of "Senior Representative, U. S.
Army Standardization Group, United Kingdom," he went on to
say that it was certainly a minuscule contribution to
formulation of policy. His point, however, was that
... the NWC experience is a meaningful one in terms
of increased understanding, better background, and
the exchange of viewpoints and ideas. Anyone exposed
to the NWC experience certainly comes away better
prepared to make a contribution to foreign policy
formulation - no matter how insignificant - when the
time comes. Some of our graduates rise to positions
where they can wield a "profound" influence in a
single decision. Others, in lesser positions, may,
through day to day action, have a cumulative "pro-
found" influence.
Many of the elaborating comments were general in
nature. A Foreign Service Officer commented: "It pro-
vided a better understanding of the military aspects of
our foreign policy." Another said: "It disposed of the
unflattering aspects of my preconceptions concerning the
'military mind. 1 " Many answers reflected, in general, a
"broadening of horizons." A Lieutenant General, U. S. Air
Force, commented that the course gave him "a better knowl-
edge of how State and Foreign Service work and think."








of different backgrounds is a recurring one here and else-
where in the answers.
As indicated previously, the answers to the third
question were of little value, in that the question failed
to provoke many thoughtful answers. Only eighty-four
answered the question at all, with thirty-nine saying
"yes 11 and thirty-five "no" to whether any particular phase
had been of special value in the foreign policy field.
There were ten ambiguous answers.
In retrospect, the wording "has any particular
phase ... been especially valuable to you ..." appears
unfortunate, and meant different things to different
people. In reviewing the returned questionnaires, the
only conclusion to be derived from the answers to this
question is that by far the most frequently mentioned
"phase" was the opportunity afforded for learning the view-
points of other services through the day-to-day associa-
4tion, seminars, group study, and committee problems.
One specific comment of value, received from a
civilian employee in the Department of Defense, praising
4Although it cannot be argued that this "phase" is
not important, see Edward L. Katzanbach, Jr., "The Demo-
tion of Professionalism at the War Colleges," U. j5. Naval
Institute Proceedings , 745:34-41, March, 1965, for the
argument that students seem to get so much from fellow









the value of the College committee problems, should be
mentioned here. It provides the best specific example of
the "influence" turned up by the questionnaire. He writes:
As a specific case in point, I was committee chairman
for a 1952 National Wax- College problem on India-
Pakistan and Afghan-Pushtu disputes. In 1963, I
spent two months in London and New Delhi coordinating
U, S. and British military assistance programs for
India. The former was a most useful background for
the latter. Again, the Nash commitment of MAP to
Germany in 1953 was developed on the basis of shared
experiences with two War College classmates
[a Foreign Service Officer] and
__
_^__^_ ""[Army Officer]. Each of us played a signi-
ficant role in its negotiation and subsequent imple-
mentation.
III. THE COMMENTS
As the last entry on the questionnaire, there was
typed in capital letters
ANY COK: :NTS ON HOW YOU FEEL ABOUT THE NWC COURSE
IN RETROSPECT, OR ABOUT THE SUBJECT OF THE WAR
COLLEGE AND FOREIGN POLICY, WILL BE WELCOMED BELOW
OR ON THE REVERSE.
A considerable number accepted the invitation, with some
contributing novel points of view, including some rather
astringent comments.
The overall scheme of the College plan of instruc-
tion was criticized by several, but from opposite view-
points. A senior Foreign Service Officer wrote: "My
major criticism was that we were not kept on a tighter












would have profited even more under a tighter disciplinary
policy* In contrast to this view, there were several who
expressed the thought that there was too much regimenta-
tion, with not enough time set aside for individual pur-
suits, especially use of the library facilities* An
Ambassador wrote
I • • . continue to feel that a little more time
should be allowed to the individual student to
"browse" intellectually in the superb library
facilities offered by the NWC* Too much of the
required reading seemed padded* A little more
time could have been left to mature men to seek
their own channels of thought* Similarly, on
field trips, briefings were ticked off on an hour-
by-hour basis wherever we stopped, with a minimum
of time allowed for "looking around. ' <e felt
the Joint Chiefs were afraid of criticism should
they allow us any free time* A little more ma-
turity in the management viewpoint of this aspect of
a superb program seemed to be in order*
The subject of the added prestige of the graduate
was commer on by several of those who filled out the
questionnaire* The "snob appeal" of being a graduate of
the National War College has been recognised ever since
the school *s inception* One Army general officer linked
the prestige factor directly with influence on foreign
policy
t
I feel my influence has been greatly enhanced by
attendance at NWC* In Europe, particularly among
the senior military men in NATO commands, war
college level schooling, and particularly the
national War College, is a matter of prestige
-
Somehow, Italian, French and German officers
always know every senior U* 3. officer's back-
ground* I felt my opinions were respected more
because I was a NWC graduate*
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It has been a relatively simple task to demonstrate
that, in fact, graduates of the National War College do
occupy positions in the United States Government hierarchy
in which, by virtue of their jobs, they have a profound
influence on foreign policy formulation. It appears incon-
testable that such graduates as members of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Deputy Assistant Secretaries of State, and the
Executive Secretary of the National Security Council make
a significant impress on foreign policy in its forraulative
stages. Likewise, we have observed that in the next one
or two layers just below the top men of the Government, in
jobs such as Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs,
in the Department of State; and Director for the European
Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs), the graduates are to be
found in ever-Increasing numbers. But, has the common
experience of attendance at the National War College
resulted in improved or different foreign policy due to
the part played by these individual graduates? Or, would
the foreign policy formulated under the influence of these













It is submitted that, while the proposition is not
susceptible of mathematical-type proof, the fact that
several hundred high and middle level decision makers in
the United States Government have had this common educa-
tional experience is in itself a significant element in
the foreign policy formulation process. The very nature
of the National War College and its program makes such a
conclusion inescapable.
The course of instruction itself plays a part. The
student is exposed to a mass of information coming from a
curriculum seemingly tailored to educate a foreign policy
maker. The quality of the lecturers is incomparable, and
the facilities for reading and writing and research are
superb. It is a stimulating year for every student, as
well as a leisurely year—a most welcome change of pace
for many of the students whose previous experience has
included a high proportion of pressure-filled positions.
It is trite to say that the student gets out of the course
what he puts into it, but nevertheless the statement is
more true here than at most schools. With no grades,
class standings, or competition of any kind, it is neces-
sary that there be a considerable individual conscience
present, preventing the year of "study" from deteriorating
into a full holiday. The writer's observation is that
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the vast majority of the students take full advantage of
i
the educational opportunity.
At least equally important with the course of in-
struction is the intimate association with fellow students,
and the resultant sharing of experiences and viewpoints.
Much work is done in committees. Social and athletic
events contribute to the informal camaraderie. As a former
Commandant of the College has said:
Without doubt the most distinctive element of our
program is the degree to which we engender greater
understanding between the civilian and military
components of government, and the greater under-
standing gained by the military of the capability of
our sister services.
*
This "greater understanding" comes about largely not from
formal instruction, but from ten months of close associa-
tion.
Finally, a third element of influence on foreign
policy exercised by the College is through the continuing
Answers received from a questionnaire which 102
graduates answered in 1961, reveal that the work load at
the College was considered "excellent to outstanding" by
64 per cent. About 18 per cent felt that it should be
increased, and only 2 per cent that it should be lightened.
From an undated memo from the Director of the Department
of Educational Development to the Commandant, subject?
Survey of Selected Graduates of the National War College.
Lieutenant General Thomas L. Harrold, USA (Re-
tired), "Leadership for National Security," General
Slectrlc orum, IV: 3 (October-December, 1961), p. 14.
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contacts among graduates after completion of the course.
An annual "Directory, Staff and Graduates of the National
War College" is published and mailed to every living
graduate* An alumni association is sponsored by the
College, and luncheons and cocktail parties of the entire
group, as well as class groups, serve as a recurring focus
of interest for the graduates on activities of the Col-
3lege. This continual renewing of acquaintance and
friendship within the group and the fostering of loyalties
to the College serve to pave the way for expediting and
smoothing the progress of government business at lower
levels; it could be hazarded that not a working day passes
that inter-service, inter-department, or inter-agency con-
tact is not made by telephone or in person between indivi-
duals whose acquaintance is based on National War College
association.
There is a considerable parallel between the con-
cepts and aims of the College, and those of the National
Security Council. Both the College and the Council came
into being at about the same time, and essentially in
response to the same stimulus: the realization of a dan-
gerous discrepancy between American political commitments
around the world, and American military capabilities. The
3The graduate may often be identified by the
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National Security Council was conceived in order that
security policies could be shaped which would include a
true coordination of political policy and military stra-
tegy. Somewhat similarly, the requirement for a politico-
military education for the preparation of selected future
decision makers was behind the founding of the National
4War College. Implicit in the mission of the College is
the aim of developing a college of grand strategy, in which
the military leaders would be given a firm grasp of today 1 s
political realities, while the foreign policy planners were
acquiring a true understanding of the military facts of
life. 5
Given this background, this mission, and the pre-
viously seen actual functioning of the College, the gradu-
ates are having, and will continue to have, an actual,
concrete influence on the fc emulation of U. S. foreign
policy.
4See William H. Hessler, "The National War College
—
A Civilian Appraisal," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings »
82:272-276, March, 1956.
5
It is just this aspect of the National War College
which Dr. Katzenbach fails to recognize adequately. His
main criticism of the Array, Navy, Air Force, and National
War Colleges is that they are not military service oriented,
While perhaps his criticism is perfectly valid for the
service War Colleges, the National War College aims at a
politico-military education and has a much larger non-
military proportion of students. His criticism of the













Preliminary Note . Much of the research for this
thesis was done in the Classified Records section of the
National War College library. Literally hundreds of docu-
ments were consulted there; each one of which is marked
with a prohibition against reproduction, quotation from,
abstraction from, or any reference linking the document
with the National War College. These documents were
invaluable sources for much of the background and history
of the College; but, because of the rules of the College,
they cannot be further identified here. It is emphasized
that great care was observed in use of the facilities of
this library, and documents were avoided which were
"classified" as security information in the usual Depart-
ment of Defense usage of the word.
In view of the foregoing, the bibliographical list
below may appear somewhat sparse.
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tion of United States Foreign^Policy (Washington:
The Brookings Institution, I960).
Lerche, Charles 0., Jr. Foreign Policy of the American
People (second edition; Englewood cTTffs : Prentice-
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Proceedings , 729:44-51, November, 1963.
Hessler, William H. "The National War College—A Civilian
Appraisal," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings ,
82:272-277, March,~T^OT.
Katzenbach, Edward L. , Jr. "The Demotion of Professionalism
at the War Colleges , " U. J5 . Naval Institute Proceed-
ings , March, 1965.
Masland, John W. "The National War College and the Adminis-
tration of Foreign Affairs," Public Administration
Review, Vol. 12, No. 4, Autumn, 1952, pp. 267-275.
p^
•YJ 9PSI
8StasI2 ,*:h ,u r ... [ol^fiH*1
!
U ; .-> B ft, M
*V t atpn
fiAillvi tsM ft # H as. idXa*»H
ftXXl
-i 3 JtVMU 1 «««(••
70
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary
Schools, Commission on Institutions of Higher Educa-










I an writing to ask your help in a research project
on which I am engaged* I am a Captain, U. S. Navy, a gra-
duate of the National War College, and assigned full time
during the current year as a student in the School of
International Service at The American University. I am a
candidate for the degree of Master of Arts in International
Relations and Organization, and in satisfaction of the
thesis requirement, I am writing on the subject "The Influ-
ence of The National War College and its Graduates on the
Formulation of United States Foreign Policy* H
As you may know, the Gerow report in 1945, which was
the real genesis of the National War College, visulalzed
that the graduates would have "a profound influence" on
formulation of U. 3. foreign policy* It is possible to
deduce from positions which graduates have held over the
years, that they must have had a considerable foreign
policy influence, but I am anxious to get personal opinions
from a cross section of graudates [sic j on the sort of in-
fluence they feel they have been able to exert, and espe-
cially whether they feel their influence has been affected
by attendance at the College*
The faculty and administration of the National War
College know of this mailing, and are interested in the
answers* You may be certain that the returned question-
naires will be treated with appropriate administrative
privacy*
\r assistance, in filling out and returning the
enclosure as soon as convenient, will be greatly appre-
ciated*
Very respectfully
Murray B* Frazee, Jr,
Captain, U.S. Navy
Enclosure
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PLEASE RETURN THIS SHEET, EVEN IP YOUR ANSWER IS NO TO
QUESTION NO. 1.
NAME
Military rank, FSO Grade, etc.
Present position
Duties, if not apparent from title
1. Do you feel that you are serving or have served, subse-
quent to attendance at NWC, in any assignment in which
you had any influence on formulation of U. S. foreign
policy? If yes, in what position(s)?
If yes, could you please elaborate?
2. if you answered "yes" to the first question, do you
feel that your attendance at NWC made a difference in
your contribution to foreign policy formulation?
If yes, would you please describe in what way your NWC
experience made such a difference?
3. Has any particular phase of the War College course been
especially valuable to you in the foreign policy field:
If yes, what phase?
ANY COMMENTS ON HOW YOU FEEL ABOUT THE NWC COURSE IN RETRO-
SPECT, OR ABOUT THE SUBJECT OF THE WAR COLLEGE AND FOREIGN
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